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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : Case No. 20020171-CA 
KORRY BARLOW SMEDLEY 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from convictions for four counts of 
aggravated sexual abuse of a child, a first degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. S 76-5-404.1 (1999). This Court has 
jurisdiction over the case pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3(2)(e)(Supp. 2002). 
?TATEMENT QF THE ISSVS QH APPEAL ANP 
?TANPAPP OF APPELATE REVIEW 
1. Where defendant's objection to certain evidence at trial 
focused wholly on its lack of relevance, did the trial court 
abuse its discretion by not considering whether it might have 
been inadmissible under other, unargued evidentiary rules? 
Where an issue has not been specifically and properly 
preserved for appellate review, it is waived. No standard of 
review applies. 
1 
2. Did the trial court properly determine that defendant's 
inquiry to an investigating detective, prior to any charges being 
filed, about "what kind of a deal he could get if he pled guilty" 
was admissible pursuant to rules 401 and 402 of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence? 
A trial court has broad discretion to determine whether 
evidence is relevant. The court commits reversible error in a 
relevancy ruling only if it has abused its discretion. State v. 
Harrison, 805 P.2d 769, 780 (Utah App.), cert, denied. 817 P.2d 
327 (Utah 1991). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONSr STATUTES ANP RV1SS 
Utah Rule of Evidence 401, defining relevant evidence, 
provides: 
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any 
tendency to make the existence of any fact 
that is of consequence to the determination 
of the action more probable or less probable 
than it would be without the evidence* 
Utah Rule of Evidence 402, governing admissibility, 
provides: 
All relevant evidence is admissible, except 
as otherwise provided by the Constitution of 
the United States or the Constitution of the 
state of Utah, statute, or by these rules, or 
by other rules applicable in courts of this 
state* Evidence which is not relevant is not 
admissible. 
2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged by information with four counts of 
aggravated sexual abuse of a child, a first degree felony (R. 1). 
His first trial ended in a mistrial after the jury failed to 
reach a unanimous verdict (R. 273: 279). After a second trial, 
the jury found defendant guilty of four counts of sexual abuse of 
a child (R. 278: 262). The court subsequently determined that 
the crimes were aggravated by defendant's position of special 
trust as an adult cohabitant of the victims' mother (Id. at 263). 
The court sentenced defendant to concurrent terms of 5 years to 
life in the Utah State Prison on counts 1 and 2 and concurrent 
terms of 5 years to life on counts 3 and 4, with the concurrent 
terms running consecutive to each other (R. 240-42). Defendant 
filed a timely notice of appeal (R. 247). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Six weeks after Debra Baldwin met defendant, she and her 
three daughters, ages 8, 6, and 5, moved into defendant's one-
bedroom apartment (R. 277: 93). Defendant and Debra slept in the 
bedroom; the three girls shared a hide-a-bed in the living room 
(Id. at 100). Defendant was employed as a painter, working a 
flexible schedule; Debra was not employed (Id. at 97, 100, 108). 
Defendant assumed the role of father in the girls' lives, playing 
with them and taking them on errands, both individually and 
together (Id. at 94-95). This arrangement, although punctuated 
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by "kind of severe" arguments between Debra and defendant, 
continued for nine months (Id. at 92-93, 95) . 
Finally, after an especially severe argument in August of 
2000, Debra decided that she "was tired of the abuse" and left 
defendant's apartment with the three girls (Id. at 92, 95). They 
walked to a nearby bus stop, where Debra calmed down, thought 
about her financial dependence on defendant, and ultimately 
decided to return to the apartment (Id. at 97, 107). When she 
told her children, "[t]hey were frantic, they did not want to go 
back" (Id. at 98). Debra testified, "I asked them why and they 
said, Because he's mean-, because he spanks us. And I asked them, 
Well, don't you love him? And they said, No, no, no, we don't 
want to go back home" (Id. at 102). At that juncture, Debra 
testified, "I asked them if he was touching them on the private 
[sic] and [the two older girls] said yes" (Id. at 98). 
Debra did not return to defendant's apartment, nor did she 
further question the girls (Id. at 103). Instead, she went to 
her sister's home for a few days, during which time she notified 
the police. She then moved with the girls to a shelter, where 
they stayed for about a month (Id. at 106, 108). 
Following Debra's call to the police, a detective with the 
family violence unit interviewed the girls and then decided to 
interview defendant (Id. at 165, 168). The detective described 
the encounter with defendant as "just a basic conversation, this 
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is a sex abuse case, you're listed as a suspect. These girls 
have said something about you, we want to talk to you about that 
today, that's why we're here" (Id. at 170). l Defendant responded 
by "den[ying] that and then he wanted to know what - you know, 
what kind of a deal he could get if he pled guilty, you know, 
exactly what the penalty would be. If he were to plead guilty, 
what would he get" (Id, at 170-71). He repeated this inquiry 
"several times" (Id. at 171). When defendant made these 
statements, the case was still in the investigation stage. No 
charges had been filed. Indeed,^ the investigating officer 
testified that no charges, penalty, or punishment had even been 
mentioned. (Id. at 171). 
In response to his inquiries, defendant was told, "'We don't 
make deals with people, that's not our job, that's not our -
position. We want to talk about the case, we want to know, you 
know, what happened. We want to get his side of the story'" 
(Id.). Defendant then mentioned that "he didn't want the girls 
to have to testify, but he just needed to know what kind of 
penalties this would come with before he would, you know, talk to 
us any further" (!£•. at 172). 
At trial, the younger girl, who was 8 at the time, testified 
that defendant was a "bad person" because "he touched me in the 
1
 Prior to the interview, defendant waived his Miranda 
rights (R. 277: 168-69). 
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wrong place'' (Id. at 114-15) . Specifically, she testified that 
he touched her on the "pee pee" and "bum" both at home and in his 
red truck (Id. at 116, 117) . She said that in the truck he kept 
one hand on the steering wheel, while he "rubbed" her "pee pee" 
over her clothes with the other (Id. at 120, 123). She also 
described defendant making her touch his penis in the truck (Id. 
at 118). She saw his penis "stuck through his zipper" (Id. at 
119). She testified that defendant made her rub lotion on it 
from a small bottle he kept in the truck, that "[his penis] was 
soft and then it got hard," and that she saw "white stuff" come 
out of it (Id. at 121)> When they were in the truck, he wiped 
himself off with a napkin (Id.). She further testified that at 
home, he touched her under her clothes and that when she rubbed 
his penis with lotion, the lotion came from a bigger bottle that 
he kept in the bedroom (Id. at 123-24). Afterwards^ he washed 
himself off in the bathroom with water while she washed the 
lotion off her hands (Id. at 121, 124). 
The older girl, 10 years old by the time of trial, also 
testified (Id. at 134). She described her relationship with 
defendant as "kind of good, kind of bad" (Id. at 136) . While she 
testified that she called defendant "Dad" and went places with 
him, she also reported that he rubbed her "pee pee" and "butt" 
with his fingers "a lot" of times (Id^ at 136-37, 158). This 
activity, lasting a "few minutes" each time, would occur both at 
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home and in the truck; sometimes, but not always, her sisters 
were present (Id. at 138) • In the truck, defendant would reach 
over and rub her "private" (Id. at 140) . He would also have her 
rub lotion on his penis, and he would sometimes buy her treats 
afterwards (Id, at 140-41) . When ''white stuff" came out of 
defendant's penis, he would wipe it off with a napkin from the 
glove box (Id. at 141) . Defendant told her "a lot of times" not 
to tell anyone "or else he'll go to jail and he'll get in big 
trouble" (Id. at 139). She testified that she did not tell 
anyone "[b]ecause i thought he would hurt me" (Id.). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
While defendant argues on appeal that his statement to the 
investigating detective should have been excluded under rules 
401, 402, 408, and 410 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, he failed 
to present objections based on rules 408 and 410 to the trial 
court. Absent either plain error or exceptional circumstances, 
neither of which he has asserted, those arguments cannot now be 
considered for the first time on appeal. They are waived. 
Defendant's only preserved argument is that the evidence 
should have been excluded because it lacked relevance. His 
statement to the detective questioning what kind of a deal he 
could get if he pled guilty, however, constitutes circumstantial 
evidence of consciousness of guilt and is, therefore, relevant. 
Even assuming for purposes of argument that the testimony 
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was not relevant, its admission did not harm defendant because, 
even without it, the outcome of his trial would likely have been 
the same. Both young victims testified in graphic detail about 
the abuse they experienced. Further, the police detective who 
interviewed the girls confirmed that their trial testimony was 
consistent with what they had each told her when she originally 
investigated the matter, 
ARGUMENT 
PQINT QNS 
WHERE DEFENDANT OBJECTED TO THE 
ADMISSION OF CERTAIN EVIDENCE 
SOLELY QN THE BASIS OF RELEVANCE, 
THIS COURT SHOULD NOT NOW CONSIDER 
FOR THE FIRST TIME WHETHER THE 
EVIDENCE MIGHT HAVE BEEN 
INADMISSIBLE UNDER OTHER, UNARGUED 
EVIDENTIARY RULES 
On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erred by 
admitting his inquiry to the detective about "what kind of a deal 
he could get if he pled guilty" (Br. of Aplt. at 8).2 Defendant 
2
 Defendant asserts that the proper standard for reviewing 
the admission of his statement to the investigating detective is 
correction of error. See Br. of Aplt. at 1. For this 
proposition, he relies on State v. Martin, a case stating that 
when the prosecutor affirmatively presents evidence, the 
defendant has a right as a matter of law to rebut that evidence. 
State v. Martin. 2002 UT 34, 1 29, 44 P.3d 805. If a trial court 
completely precludes defendant from rebutting the prosecution's 
evidence, then the appellate court reviews that ruling for 
correctness. Id. However, it a trial court makes an evidentiary 
ruling based on a relevance objection, that objection is reviewed 
for an abuse of discretion. See, e.g. , State v. Fedorowicz, 2002 
UT 67, 1 32, 52 P.3d 1194 (articulating abuse of discretion 
standard of review for relevance rulings). 
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grounds this argument on four independent bases - that admitting 
the statement violated rules 401, 402, 408, and 410 of the Utah 
Rules of Evidence. See Br. of Aplt. at 8-9. 
At trial, however, defendant objected to the admission of 
the statement made to the investigating detective based only on 
its relevance.3 Counsel argued: 
Your Honor, you'd made a ruling [at the first 
trial] that the State could go into a 
statement that was made by my client. And 
the statement was basically just that 
Detective Rackley - and she did testify at 
our last trial, that when they went to 
interview him he asked her what kind of deal 
he could get if he pled guilty. And I'm 
renewing my objection that that come in 
because it'3 irrelevant. 
I have since talked with the other detective 
that was there . . . and his recollection is 
a little bit different. His recollection is 
that at some point later on in the 
conversation [defendant] suggested that he 
thought he should talk to an attorney about 
what he was looking at. . . And I realize 
that that simply creates a factual question. 
But I think it is a question that does go to, 
again, the relevance of this. And that is, 
when they're talking to him about a certain 
charge to say they have a conversation with 
the client who doesn't have an attorney there 
and then for the client to ask, Well, what 
kind of deal are you looking at offering me 
3
 For preservation of his argument, defendant not only 
cites to his second trial, but also to his first trial, which 
ended in a mistrial. See Br. of Aplt. at 2 (citing R. 272: 182-
8 6). However, "what happened by way of ruling on the 
admissibility of evidence in the first trial, has nothing to do 
with anything that eventuated at the second trial, which was a 
trial anew, with no kinship whatever with the first case." State 
v. Llovd, 662 P.2d 28, 28 (Utah 1983). 
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is irrelevant to guilt in the case. . . 
[T]hat's my objection, your honor. 
(R. 277 at 79). 
The law is well-settled that "[t]rial counsel must state 
clearly and specifically all grounds for objection." State v. 
Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355, 1363 n.12 (Utah 1993). Absent such 
objection, an issue is not preserved for appeal. Id. And, the 
objection that is stated must "*be specific enough to give the 
trial court notice of the very error' of which counsel [or 
defendant] claims." State v. Brvant, 965 P.2d 539, 546 (Utah 
App. 1998)(quoting Tolman v. Winchester Hills Water Co., 912 P.2d 
457, 460 (Utah App. 1096)). 
Hera, defendant stated "clearly and specifically" that his 
objection was based on relevance. On appeal, therefore, his 
claims based on rules 401 and 402 of the Utah Rules of Evidence 
are plainly preserved. 
In contrast, defendant nowhere stated at trial that he was 
objecting based on rules 408 and 410 of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence. Nor did he argue the substance of those rules to the 
trial court.4 Defendant thus failed to "give the trial court 
notice of the very error" he now asserts on appeal. Tolman, 912 
P.2d at 460. Because defendant failed to provide fair notice to 
4
 That is, defendant did not argue to the trial court that 
his statement should be inadmissible because it was part of a 
plea discussion or intended to be a compromise negotiation. See 
Utah Rule of Evidence 408 and 410(4). 
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the trial court that he intended to object to the admission of 
the evidence based on rules 408 and 410, and because the trial 
court never had the opportunity to consider these grounds for 
objection, defendant's rule 408 and 410 arguments are not 
preserved for appeal.5 
POINT TWO 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS 
DISCRETION BY ADMITTING DEFENDANT'S 
STATEMENT BECAUSE IT WAS RELEVANT 
TO SHOW HIS CONSCIOUSNESS OF GUILT 
Defendant argues that his statement inquiring about what 
kind of a deal he could get was inadmissible because "[i]t did 
not have any bearing <?n any element of the crimes charged, and it 
did not make the fact that [he] otherwise denied the alleged 
abuse more or less probable" (Br. of Aplt. at 8-9). Defendant's 
relevance argument is premised on the notion that his statement 
was made as part of a plea negotiation (Id. at 24-25). 
Relevant evidence is "evidence having any tendency to make 
the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the 
determination of the action more probable or less probable than 
it would be without the evidence." Utah R. Evid. 401. Here, 
after waiving his Miranda rights, defendant uttered and then 
5
 Nor did defendant in his appellate brief assert either 
plain error or exceptional circumstances as a way around the 
waiver doctrine. See State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226, 1229 n.5 
(Utah 1995)(where defendant failed to argue that plain error or 
exceptional circumstances justified review of unpreserved issue, 
appellate court declined to consider it). 
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repeated his query to the investigating detective several times, 
all well before the State had identified, much less filed, any 
criminal charges against him (R. 277: 169, 171, 207-08). His sua 
sponte statement, made only to an investigator well before any 
charges were filed, was thus plainly not part of a "plea 
negotiation," as defendant asserts.6 
Under the circumstances here, defendant's inquiry about 
"what kind of a deal he could get if he pled guilty" suggested 
that he was thinking ahead to identify any advantages that might 
accrue to him in exchange for an admission of guilt• The 
reasonable implication of his anxious statement is that he 
thought he was guilty and was exploring ways to mitigate the 
consequences of his conduct, if at all possible. His statement 
is thus relevant as circumstantial evidence of his consciousness 
of guilt.7 
Assuming that the statement was not relevant, defendant 
further argues that its admission prejudiced him because "[t]his 
case hinged on credibility" (Br. of Aplt. at 26). He 
characterizes the testimony of the two child victims as 
6
 Had defendant made his statement after charges had been 
filed as part of a true plea negotiation with the prosecutor or 
with someone expressly authorized to negotiate a plea, then 
defendant's argument would certainly be far more palatable. 
7
 Notably, defendant does not argue on appeal that if the 
evidence was relevant, its probative value was substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. See Utah R. Evid. 
403. 
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"unsubstantiated and vague reports of abuse," speculating that 
"[t]he jurors may have been searching for some reason beyond the 
girls' testimony to believe that abuse occurred" (Id. at 27). 
Absent his statement, defendant surmises that the jury would have 
acquitted him (Id. at 28). 
Even assuming arguendo that defendant's statement was not 
relevant, excluding it would not have created a reasonable 
likelihood of a more favorable verdict for him. The testimony of 
the child victims was consistent with what each had told the 
detective shortly after the mother notified the police and with 
each other. And contrary to defendant's repeated 
characterization of their testimony as "vague," it was, in fact, 
punctuated with numerous specific and telling details. Many of 
these details related to matters about which young children would 
normally have no knowledge, absent personal experience. 
For example, the younger child did not merely state, as 
defendant implies, that he touched her in "the wrong place." See 
Br. of Aplt. at 26. Rather, she specifically described the parts 
of her body she was referring to (R. 277: 115-16). She described 
the details of how she came to see defendant's penis, what it 
looked like, and how he made her touch it (Id. at 119-20). She 
described the lotion he made her rub on his penis, where he kept 
it, and what color it was (Id. at 120-21). She described the 
physiological change in defendant's penis and described 
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ejaculation (Id. at 120-21). She described the difference, 
depending on whether they were at home or in the truck, in how he 
cleaned himself up afterwards (Id. at 121-22). 
The older sister's testimony also detailed defendant's 
touching, listing the various locations at which it occurred and 
details of how defendant would touch her (Id, at 137-38, 152, 
156). She mentioned the lotion, described ejaculation, and 
described defendant retrieving napkins from the glove box in his 
truck to wipe himself off (Id. at 141) . She also stated that 
defendant would sometimes buy her treats afterwards. (Id. at 
152). She testified that defendant told her "a lot of times" not 
to tell or he would go to jail (Id. at 139). 
Furthermore, the investigating detective corroborated that 
the girls' testimony was substantially similar to what they had 
related to her during her initial interview (Id. at 167). 
Specifically, the detective stated that the in-court testimony of 
the children was consistent with what they had told her regarding 
trips to the store with defendant in his truck, the use of 
lotion, wiping himself off with a napkin, where and how the 
touching occurred at home, and where the mother was when it 
happened (Id. at 167). 
Finally, the record contains no evidence that the mother 
influenced the children's testimony In any way. Indeed, she had 
no motive to do so. Defendant was not the father of the 
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children, the mother was financially dependent on defendant, and 
she would have had nothing at all to gain by trying to influence 
their testimony (R. 277 at 93, 97, 107) . And the evidence is 
undisputed that, after the initial revelation at the bus stop, 
the mother did not question either girl further about defendant's 
activities with them (IsL. at 98, 104, 126, 143). 
Ultimately, of course, "determinations of witness 
credibility are left to the jury. The jury is free to believe or 
disbelieve all or part of any witness's testimony." State v. 
Haves, 860 P.2d 968, 972 (Utah App. 1993)(citing State v. Jonas, 
793 P.2d 901, 904-05 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 804 P.2d 1232 
(Utah 1990)). And, 
[w]hen the evidence presented is conflicting 
or disputed, the jury serves as the exclusive 
judge of both the credibility of witnesses 
and the weight to be given particular 
evidence. Ordinarily, a reviewing court may 
not reassess credibility or reweigh the 
evidence, but must resolve conflicts in the 
evidence in favor of the jury verdict. 
State v. Workman, 852 P.2d 981, 984 (Utah 1993)(citations 
omitted). 
Here, the evidence was essentially undisputed and, as was 
well within its prerogative, the jury chose to believe the girls 
and the investigating detective. Although defendant's repeated 
statement suggested a guilty consciousness, the State's case did 
not rise or fall on it. Considered in light of the girls' 
consistent and persuasive testimony, even if the trial court had 
15 
excluded defendant's statement about what kind of a deal he could 
get, the outcome of the trial would likely have been just the 
same. Consequently, defendant has failed to demonstrate that he 
suffered harm by its admission. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated, this Court should affirm defendant's 
conviction on four counts of aggravated sexual abuse of a child, 
all first degree felonies. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this J±_ day of November, 2002. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
JOANNE C. SLOTNIK 
Assistant Attorney General 
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